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We formulate and estimate a structural model of ￿rm investment
behavior that speci￿es the exact channel through which ￿nancial fric-
tions bite. The model also allows for the existence of both convex and
non-convex costs to adjusting capital. Essentially, we move beyond
simply testing and rejecting a neoclassical model without frictions.
Our quantitative estimates show that both real and ￿nancial frictions
have an important e⁄ect on ￿rm investment dynamics.
Keywords: investment, adjustment costs, ￿nancing constraints.
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Gaining an understanding into the dynamics of investment is crucial as it
is an important component of aggregate activity. Although a large amount
of research e⁄ort has been spent on trying to understand it, initial empiri-
cal results of this research have been largely disappointing. The estimates
of investment responsiveness to fundamentals have been very low whereas
output terms (such as pro￿ts) have been very signi￿cant contrary to theoret-
ical implications. This has continuously set a challenge on empirical work.
Two avenues have been promising in explaining investment dynamics. First,
irreversibilities and ￿xed costs to investment may lead ￿rms to experience
episodes of zero investment as well as episodes of large investment in response
to similarly small movements in fundamentals. This is in sharp contrast to
convex adjustment costs which, at least in their usual quadratic implemen-
tation, imply proportional responses. Second, ￿rms rely mainly on internal
sources of funds to ￿nance investment. This may provide evidence of a di-
vergence between the costs of internal and external funds. Early theories
leading to such a cost wedge or, even, rationing of external funds invoked the
existence of information asymmetries or agency problems. The importance
of internal funds in predicting aggregate investment has been long recog-
nized. Considering the above, in modelling investment one should allow for
the existence of both convex and non-convex adjustment costs and specify
the channel through which ￿nancial frictions bite. In this paper, we for-
mulate such a theoretical model, estimate, and evaluate it. In so doing we
are moving beyond simply testing and rejecting a neoclassical model with-
out frictions and instead provide quantitative estimates of the importance of
di⁄erent frictions, real and ￿nancial, on ￿rm investment. In our structural
model ￿nancial imperfections enter through a premium on the cost of debt
that depends on the ￿rm￿ s leverage ratio. We estimate the model using in-
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-direct inference. This method involves picking some appropriate regression
coe¢ cients or data moments as ￿benchmarks￿that we would like the model
to match well. Then, the structural parameters are estimated so that the
model, when simulated, generates ￿benchmarks￿as close to those of the ac-
tual data as possible. The method is very ￿ exible in allowing the use of a
wide selection of ￿benchmarks.￿ Our benchmarks include moments of the
distribution of investment rates as well as coe¢ cients from an investment
regression involving pro￿tability shocks and debt leverage. Our data set is
an unbalanced panel of 170 German manufacturing ￿rms over the period
1992-1999 containing 1163 observations. It is derived from the AMADEUS
database. The ￿rms are not an unbiased sample of the total manufacturing
population, rather they are drawn from the largest German manufacturing
￿rms. Our quantitative estimates show that both real and ￿nancial frictions
are important in determining ￿rm investment dynamics. However, at least
for our sample of large German manufacturing ￿rms, the impact of exter-
nal ￿nance constraints on investment is relatively modest. Regarding real
frictions, the major component of adjustment costs seems to be ￿xed costs.
6
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Investment is an important component of aggregate activity and much ef-
fort has been spent on trying to understand it. The workhorse of modern
investment research has been Tobin￿ s Q theory and the neoclassical theory
of investment with convex adjustment costs.1 In this framework, the market
value of capital is an important determinant of a ￿rm￿ s capital investment
decision. It is fair to say that the initial empirical results of this research
have been largely disappointing. Brie￿ y, the estimates of investment respon-
siveness to fundamentals have been very low whereas output terms (such as
pro￿ts) have been very signi￿cant contrary to theoretical implications. This
has continuously set a challenge on empirical work.
The research of the last ￿fteen years has experienced two breakthroughs.
In reverse chronological order, one emphasizes the importance of nonlineari-
ties and the other of ￿nancing constraints. Below we review brie￿ y these two
in￿ uential strands.
Nonlinearity
This literature argues that the apparent failures of neoclassical theory are
a result of misspeci￿cation of the costs that are relevant in the capital adjust-
ment decision. In particular, irreversibilities and ￿xed costs to investment
may lead ￿rms to experience episodes of zero investment as well as episodes
of large investment in response to similarly small movements in fundamen-
tals. This is in sharp contrast to convex adjustment costs which, at least
in their usual quadratic implementation, imply proportional responses. This
1See Tobin (1969), Lucas (1967), Mussa (1977), Abel (1980) and Hayashi(1982), for
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One of the ￿rst empirical contributions in this mold is Doms and Dunne
(1998) who show that in a sample of U.S. manufacturing establishments
about 72 percent of a typical establishment￿ s total investment over 17 years
is concentrated in a single year. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995)
and Caballero and Engel (1999) show that investment response to funda-
mentals, measured by the gap between actual and desired capital stock, is
disproportionately larger for a larger gap. Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power
(1999) and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2000) provide evidence that the hazard
of a large investment ￿spike￿is increasing in the years since the last invest-
ment ￿spike.￿Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), Barnett and Sakellaris (1999),
and Abel and Eberly (2002a) ￿nd that investment responsiveness to Tobin￿ s
Q is highly non-linear. Finally, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) ￿nd that for some
plants in the US aerospace industry the discounts on reselling capital assets
average 25 percent. All this evidence is consistent with important non-convex
adjustment costs. An in￿ uential paper by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003)
provides structural estimates supporting the existence of both convex and
￿xed costs in plant-level investment activities in US manufacturing.
In summary, some lessons from this literature are that: 1) Tobin￿ s Q is
quite informative for investment once nonlinearity is allowed, and 2) it is not
warranted to give structural adjustment cost interpretation to coe¢ cients
based on regressions of investment on Q.3
2The role of irreversibilities was stressed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Bertola and
Caballero (1994), and Abel and Eberly (1996), among others. The role of ￿xed costs was
stressed by Abel and Eberly (1994), Caballero and Leahy (1996), Caballero and Engel
(1998), and Caballero and Engel (1999), among others.
3Abel and Eberly (2002b and 2003) provide some fresh models resulting in the second
lesson above.
provides an explanation for the low estimated responsiveness in the data of
8
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This may provide evidence of a divergence between the costs of internal and
external funds. Early theories leading to such a cost wedge or, even, rationing
of external funds invoked the existence of information asymmetries or agency
problems. The importance of internal funds in predicting aggregate invest-
ment has been recognized at least since Meyer and Kuh (1957). However,
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) has been instrumental in connecting
this observation to ￿nancial market imperfections and testing it at the ￿rm
level. Their basic working hypothesis is that the sensitivity of investment to
cash ￿ ow should be higher for ￿rms that face a larger wedge in the cost of in-
ternal and external funds (monotonicity hypothesis). They argue they could
identify a priori liquidity constrained ￿rms and then demonstrated for these
a high sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ows. On the other hand, Tobin￿ s Q
appears to have only a marginal impact on investment for these ￿rms.5 6
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), however, have questioned the validity of
this approach for testing the existence of ￿nancing constraints. They argue
that the monotonicity hypothesis is not a necessary prediction of a model of
optimal investment under ￿nancial constraints. They also question several of
the methods used in the literature to identify a priori liquidity constrained
￿rms.7
4Ross, Wester￿eld, and Jordan (1999) document that ￿rms raise more than 80 percent
of equity from internal sources.
5A voluminous literature followed them in this approach including Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991) for Japanese ￿rms. See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for a
survey.
6A parallel literature has examined inventory investment behavior arguing for the im-
portance of ￿nancing constraints in explaining the dramatic cycles in inventory investment.
See Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998) among
others.
7See also Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) and Kaplan and Zingales (2000) as
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a signi￿cant regressor in standard investment regressions that include Q.
Furthermore, ￿nancing constraints are not necessary to obtain signi￿cant
cash ￿ ow coe¢ cients either. Empirical work by Erickson and Whited (2000)
demonstrates that the sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow in regressions
including Tobin￿ s Q is to a large extent due to measurement error in Q.
Cooper and Ejarque (2003a) demonstrates that the statistical signi￿cance
of cash ￿ ow in a standard Q investment regression may re￿ ect ￿rm market
power rather than ￿nancing constraints.8 Abel and Eberly (2003) have a
similar theoretical point in the absence of any adjustment cost.
We should make clear that none of these criticisms actually disprove the
importance of ￿nancing constraints in in￿ uencing ￿rm investment. Their
message is that the use of reduced-form investment regressions where Tobin￿ s
Q is meant to control for fundamentals and cash ￿ ow to pick up the in￿ uence
of ￿nancial market imperfections is dubious.
Some other work has followed di⁄erent methods in testing for the pres-
ence of ￿nancing constraints. A sizable strand of the literature, starting with
Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992)
has used the investment Euler equation to test whether internal funds a⁄ect
the ￿rm￿ s incremental intertemporal investment allocation.9 Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1999) construct a measure of marginal Q as well as a mea-
sure of ￿nancial factors and include them in investment regressions. Hu and
Schiantarelli (1998) estimate an explicit switching regressions model for in-
vestment. Whited (2004) examines the e⁄ects of external ￿nance constraints
8In a related paper, Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991) have demonstrated that monop-
olistic competition introduces output in the investment equation in addition to Q.
9There are numerous other papers using this approach. Among these are Hubbard,
Kashyap and Whited (1995), and Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996).
Other criticisms have arisen too. Gomes (2001) demonstrates that the
10
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papers ￿nd support for the hypothesis that ￿nancial constraints a⁄ect ￿rm
investment.
Despite the importance of both ￿nancial imperfections and nonconvexi-
ties in determining investment, there is only a limited number of attempts
to integrate these two lines of theory. For example, the theoretical model
created by Lensink and Sterken (2002) combines credit market imperfections
and uncertainty about investment returns, which might be caused by irre-
versibility of investment.
What should be clear from the above discussion is that we are desper-
ately in need of structure in investigating investment. This structure should
allow for the existence of both convex and non-convex adjustment costs and
specify the channel through which ￿nancial frictions bite.10 In this paper, we
formulate such a theoretical model, estimate, and evaluate it. In so doing we
are moving beyond simply testing and rejecting a neoclassical model with-
out frictions and instead provide quantitative estimates of the importance of
di⁄erent frictions, real and ￿nancial, on ￿rm investment. In our structural
model ￿nancial imperfections enter through a premium on the cost of debt
that depends on the ￿rm￿ s leverage ratio. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) review the literature that provides theoretical justi￿cation for this
formulation.
We estimate the model using indirect inference as proposed by Gourier-
oux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Smith (1993). This method involves
picking some appropriate regression coe¢ cients or data moments as ￿bench-
10Bayraktar (2002) constructs a similar model combining di⁄erent types of costs in the
capital adjustment process and ￿nancial market imperfections. But this model has been
simulated in a way to explain the investment behavior of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms.
on a capital stock adjustment hazard: the probability of undertaking a large
11
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￿ exible in allowing the use of a wide selection of ￿benchmarks.￿Care needs
to be taken, however, so that appropriate ones are selected. Our benchmarks
include moments of the distribution of investment rates as well as coe¢ -
cients from an investment regression involving pro￿tability shocks and debt
leverage.
In section 2 we develop a model of optimal investment behavior of a
￿rm with nonconvex and convex adjustment costs and ￿nancing constraints.
Section 3 contains the empirical results of the estimation by indirect inference
and the evaluation of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We model a monopolistically competitive ￿rm. In the beginning of period t;
￿rm i has real capital stock, Kit, which re￿ ects all investment decisions up
to last period, and net ￿nancial liabilities, Bit, which includes both ￿nancial
assets and liabilities (debt, cash, retained income etc.). If Bit is positive,
it re￿ ects the debt stock borrowed last period. On the other hand, if Bit
is negative, it is retained income that was invested in assets bearing a risk-
free return of r, the risk-free market interest rate. We assume that debt
contracts are written for one period and, similarly, ￿nancial assets have a
one-period term. Before making any investment decision, the ￿rm observes
the current period aggregate and idiosyncratic pro￿tability shocks. Given
these state variables, the ￿rm decides on investment and on the amount of
debt that needs to be borrowed (or on the amount of dividend retention).
The behavioral assumption we maintain is that ￿rm managers maximize the
present discounted value of dividends, Dit; paid out to shareholders.
marks￿that we would like the model to match well. Then, the structural pa-
rameters are estimated so that the model, when simulated, generates ￿bench-
12
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where 0 < ￿ < 1; re￿ ecting the degree of monopoly power.11 Ait is the current
period pro￿tability shock. It may contain both an idiosyncratic component
as well as an aggregate one.12 The buying price of capital, p; is assumed
to be constant. We also assume that capital is the only quasi-￿xed factor of
production, and all variable factors, such as labor and materials, have already
been maximized out of the problem. The discount factor, ￿; is ￿xed. The
implied discount rate is assumed to be greater than r, the market interest
rate at which the ￿rm can lend.
2.1 Adjustment Costs
The ￿rm faces various costs when adjusting its capital stock. Our model
is general enough to accommodate both convex and non-convex adjustment
costs.13
11This functional form of the operating pro￿t function is valid under the assumptions of
constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, constant-elasticity demand
function, and ￿ exible labor and materials inputs. Alternatively, it could be derived from a
decreasing-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function under perfect or imperfect
competition, though this is not the approach we take in our implementation.
12The pro￿tability shock is a function of technology, demand, wage, and materials cost
shocks as well as structural parameters. Following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003), we
assume that the aggregate shock component, At, is a ￿rst-order, two state Markov process
with At 2 fAh;Alg where h and l denotes high and low value of shocks. The idiosyncratic
shock is also a ￿rst-order Markov process and in our empirical work it takes eleven possible
values.
13In an earlier version of this paper we also allowed for the possibility of partial reversibil-
ity of capital. Our estimates of a discount in the resale price of capital were insigni￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero so we have dropped this feature. Given that the results in Ramey and
Shapiro (2001) and casual observation point to the existence of (at times) large discounts,
this result is puzzling. We believe that we cannot identify the resale price discount with
our data as our observations come exclusively from relatively successful, continuing ￿rms.
Essentially, in order to identify the discount one needs a fair amount of observations with
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We employ the assumption of a quadratic function, which is common in








parameter ￿ a⁄ects the magnitude of total and marginal adjustment costs.
The higher is ￿, the higher is the marginal cost of investing and the lower is
the responsiveness of investment to variations in the underlying pro￿tability
of capital.
Fixed costs
We also allow for the possibility that there is a component of costs that
is ￿xed when investment is undertaken regardless of the investment￿ s magni-
tude: F ￿Kit: In order for this cost to be relevant at all stages of a ￿rm￿ s life
we assume that it is proportional to a ￿rm￿ s size as measured by its capital
stock. The parameter F determines the magnitude of ￿xed costs.
2.2 Financial Market Imperfections
Firms may ￿nance investment out of their retained earnings or by raising
funds in the capital markets. Retained funds consist of current operating
pro￿ts, ￿(Ait;Kit); or net ￿nancial assets carried over from last period. We
assume here that the only source of external ￿nance is through debt and that
no new equity may be issued by the ￿rm.14 In the presence of ￿nancial market
imperfections, there might be a cost advantage to using internal funds as
opposed to external ones. In particular, the cost of borrowing may be higher
than the risk-free market interest rate. This external ￿nance premium will
depend on the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial health, which may be captured by the ratio of
its net worth to total assets. Assuming that capital is the only collateral asset
14Chirinko (1997) constructs a theoretical framework to examine the impact of ￿nancial
constraints on the speci￿cation of Q investment equations. His model allows for debt and
equity ￿nance. In our model we excluded equity ￿nance since for most German ￿rms the
marginal external source of funds is debt as indicated below.
14
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Bit
Kit; that is the ratio of debt to the value of capital. We assign the following





Note that this premium exists only when B > 0: The ￿rm￿ s lending rate
is una⁄ected. The coe¢ cient ￿ determines the magnitude of the external
￿nance premium, and, in turn, the magnitude of the ￿nancial market im-
perfections. The expected sign of ￿ is non-negative. This means that ￿rms
maintaining a higher leverage ratio need to pay higher premia.
Many studies assume that high debt stock relative to the capital stock
is an indicator that ￿rms are ￿nancially vulnerable since their net worth is
low. Lenders to these ￿rms incur default risk and charge an external ￿nance
premium.16 Pratap and Rendon (2003) gives theoretical justi￿cation for the
form we use to capture ￿nancial market imperfections. That paper shows
that risk-neutral, perfectly competitive lenders dealing with ￿rms that may
default on debt and exit their industry optimally charge a premium over
the risk-free rate that depends positively on ￿rm debt and negatively on
￿rm capital. Here we abstract from modelling bankruptcy and default but
capture their e⁄ect on investment behavior through a debt interest premium.
The restriction that no new equity may be issued by the ￿rm or, alter-
natively, that debt be the marginal source of external ￿nance is introduced
through a non-negativity constraint on dividends. We do not think that re-
stricting the ￿rms external ￿nance to only debt and excluding equity is too
15Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) use this kind of external ￿nance premium. But they
do not assign any functional form to it. Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996) use an
explicit form of external ￿nance premium, which is linear in the leverage ratio.
16 Some examples of these studies are: Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Bernanke, Camp-
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An European Central Bank study (ECB, 2002) suggests that loans are by
far the most important source of external ￿nance. During the period 1998-
2000, external ￿nancing through new loans averaged 6.7 percent of GDP.
In contrast the gross amount of capital raised by new shares (both listed
and non-listed) amounted to 1.3 percent in 1998 (and 1.2 percent of GDP in
2000).
2.3 Value Maximization
The ￿rm manager￿ s dynamic program can be written as follows:
V
￿(Ait;Kit;Bit) = max fV
a(Ait;Kit;Bit);V
na(Ait;Kit;Bit)g: (3)
In words, the manager needs to choose optimally between buying or selling
capital, with value V a; or undertaking no investment at all, with value V na.












￿(Ait;Kit) ￿ Cj(Kit;Iit) + Bit+1 ￿ (1 + r)(1 + ￿it(Kit;Bit))Bit
when Bit > 0
￿(Ait;Kit) ￿ Cj(Kit;Iit) + Bit+1 ￿ (1 + r)Bit when Bit < 0
(5)
Iit = Kit+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kit; (6)
Dit ￿ 0; (7)
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 566
December 2005where V ￿(￿) is the value function, ￿EAit+1jAitV ￿(￿) is the present discounted
future value of the ￿rm, ￿it(￿) is the external ￿nance premium, C(￿) is the
investment cost function, Iit stands for investment, ￿ is the depreciation rate,
and i , t are ￿rm and time indexes respectively.
The investment cost, captured by the function C(￿); depends on the man-
ager￿ s discrete choice. In the case of non-zero investment, j = a; C(￿) contains
the purchase cost as well as ￿xed and convex adjustment costs:
C







Kit + FKit: (8)
When no action is undertaken regarding investment, j = na; the invest-
ment costs are zero:
C
na(Kit;Iit) = 0: (9)
In summary the set of structural parameters is: f￿;r;￿;￿;￿;F;p;￿g:
These together with the transition matrix for the pro￿tability shocks (Ait+1)
determine the behavior of the model.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data Set
Our data set is an unbalanced panel of 170 German manufacturing ￿rms
over the period 1992-1999 containing 1163 observations. It is derived from
the AMADEUS database. The ￿rms are not an unbiased sample of the total
manufacturing population, rather they are drawn from the largest German
manufacturing ￿rms.17 This is mainly because data are not available for
smaller manufacturing ￿rms.18 The median ￿rm in our sample has a capital
17Our ￿nal sample contains not only very large well known ￿rms such as Bayer, BASF,
Volkswagen, BMW, and Adidas-Salomon, but also much smaller (but still relatively large)
less well known ￿rms such as Schwabenverlag, Aqua Signal, and Buckau Walter.
18For more details on sample selection see the appendix.
17
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170 ￿rms, they represent more than 20 percent of the manufacturing industry
capital stock. While the total replacement value of these ￿rms￿capital stock
in 1995 was 101 billion euro, it was 483 billion euro for the whole manufac-
turing industry in Germany. The median investment rate is relatively high at
0.16. We checked company annual reports and the ￿nancial press in order to
identify major merger or acquisition activities. We deleted ￿rm observations
from our data sample when the investment ￿gure entailed such activities
(rather than buying of new equipment or buildings). However, despite our
best intentions, there is a possibility that we could not identify every pos-
sible acquisition. So the investment rate may include minor acquisitions or
mergers.
Table 1 contains further summary statistics of the data sample. Table 2
shows some features of the investment rate. Around 0.7 percent of the ob-
servations entail an investment rate near zero, which is de￿ned as less than 1
percent in absolute value. At ￿rst sight this looks small, compared to values
found, for example by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003) who state that the in-
action rate is 8 percent for US manufacturing plants. However given that our
￿rms are, to a large degree, operating multiple plants, a lower inaction rate is
not surprising. For instance, suppose a ￿rm operates two plants each having
an inaction rate of 8 percent, and also assume that the inaction periods are
uncorrelated. This would lead to a ￿rm-level inaction rate of approximately
0.6 percent per year. Table 2 also presents that around 4.7 percent of the
investment rates are negative, which was 10.4 percent in Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2003). Finally, 38 percent of investment observations are above 20
percent, which is often used as a cuto⁄ value to characterize spikes.
18
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mean median st.dev min max
Iit=Kit￿1 0.19 0.16 0.16 -0.50 0.88
Kit 661 133 2194 2 26000
CFit=Kit￿1 0.30 0.23 0.41 -0.84 3.44
Note: Capital stock is in million euros measured in 1995 prices.
Table 2. Features of the Distribution of the Investment Rate
jIit=Kit￿1j < 0:01 0.9%
jIit=Kit￿1j < 0:02 3.3%
Iit=Kit￿1 < 0 4.7%
Iit=Kit￿1 > 0:20 38%
Iit=Kit￿1 > 0:25 25%
corr(g iit￿1; e iit) 0.008
corr(Iit=Kit￿1;Iit￿1=Kit￿2) 0.30
Note: e iit is the deviation of the investment rate at ￿rm i in year t from
the ￿rm speci￿c mean.
3.2 Pro￿tability and Shocks
In our model, the pro￿tability shocks, Ait; are the only exogenous state
variable. They represent the con￿ uence of demand and technology shocks.
Our empirical strategy involves identifying these shocks directly in the data
through estimating the pro￿t function given in Equation (1). This provides us
with an estimate of the pro￿t function￿ s slope parameter, ￿; and an estimate
of the transition matrix of the pro￿t shocks.
3.2.1 Estimation of the Pro￿t Function and the Pro￿t Shocks
First, we need a consistent estimate of ￿, the slope of the pro￿t function.




where the productivity shock at time t, Ait = eai+at+ait; is decomposed into
a ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect, ai; an aggregate time e⁄ect, at; and an idiosyncratic com-
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of monopoly power. We allow for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic com-
ponent, i.e. we assume that ait follows an AR(1) process:
ait = ￿ait￿1 + ￿it; (11)
where ￿it is i.i.d.
Taking logs and quasi-di⁄erencing the pro￿t function, on the one hand,






t + ￿￿it￿1 + ￿kit ￿ ￿￿kit￿1 + ￿it; (12)
M ￿it =M a
￿
t + ￿ M ￿it￿1 + ￿ M kit ￿ ￿￿ M kit￿1+ M ￿it; (13)
with a￿
t = at ￿ ￿at￿1 and a￿
i = ai(1 ￿ ￿).
We estimate this system of equation by GMM (see Blundell and Bond,
1998) using the following orthogonality conditions: E(￿it￿ M kit￿1) = 0,
E(￿it￿ M ￿it￿1;) = 0, E(M ￿it ￿ kit￿2) = 0, E(M ￿it ￿ ￿it￿2) = 0. Essentially
these orthogonality conditions state that the fundamental shocks are uncor-
related with past pro￿ts and past levels of the capital stock. Our estimate
for ￿ is 0.47 with a standard error of 0.05. Our estimate for ￿ is 0.89 with a
standard error of 0.15.
3.3 Calculation and Decomposition of the Pro￿t Shocks
In principle one could use the pro￿t and capital stock data to calculate the
pro￿t shocks, Ait (i.e. by simply using the pro￿t equation ￿it=K￿
it = Ait).
However, we have noticed that pro￿t series were highly variable, presumably
contained measurement error. So we use the following alternative way to
determine these shocks. One can show that in our theoretical model pro￿ts
are equal to a ￿xed factor times the wage bill:
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where c is the ￿xed factor.
Thus, we can calculate the pro￿t shocks (up to a multiplicative factor)
using Equations (10) and (14) as
[ Ait=c = witLit=K
b ￿
it: (15)
We then decompose the pro￿t shocks, [ Ait=c; into a ￿xed component and
time varying component by regressing the log of the pro￿t shock, [ Ait=c; on
(a constant and) ￿xed ￿rm e⁄ects.19 We call the residuals of the regressions
e ait. They are estimates of the time varying part of the pro￿t shock (in logs):
at+ait. The time varying component, e ait; is used in the investment regression.
One can further split e ait to obtain estimates of the aggregate and the
idiosyncratic components, respectively at and ait, by simply regressing e ait on
time dummies. We call these estimates b at and b ait: An analysis of variance
decomposition into these two components reveals that practically all variation
is due to the idiosyncratic time varying component, b ait.
Table 3. Features of the (Firm Demeaned) Pro￿t Shocks (in logs):e ait
min: -0.70
max : 0.78
std. dev. e ait :0.16
std. dev. b at : 0.026
autocorrelation e ait: 0.48
The dynamics of the estimated idiosyncratic shock obtained from the
labor data is consistent with the one obtained from the pro￿t data. The
point estimate of the autocorrelation of e ait, which is 0.48, is quite close to
19Note that one cannot identify the ￿xed e⁄ect from the constant c seperately. However
since we are not interested in the level of the parameter Ait, but rather in its variation,
this distinction is irrelevant for our purposes.
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system above.
3.4 The Relationship between Investment, Pro￿t Shocks
and the Leverage Ratio
We study the following relationship between investment, pro￿tability shocks,
and the leverage ratio
e iit =  0+ 1 g iit￿1+ 2e ait+ 3(e ait)









where e iit is the deviation of the investment rate at ￿rm i in year t from
the ￿rm speci￿c mean, f ait is the demeaned pro￿t shock , ^ Bit=Kit is the de-
meaned leverage ratio, and (f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2 is the product of both squared. This
relationship was suggested by careful examination of the policy function for
future capital. Pro￿tability shocks as well as variations in the debt leverage
ratio seem to have non-linear e⁄ects on investment. In particular, the last
term was suggested by the observation that variations in the debt leverage
ratio have e⁄ect on investment mostly when debt is high, capital is low, and
pro￿tability is high. In simulations of the model we con￿rmed that small
variations in the structural parameters produced large variations in the coef-
￿cients of the above reduced form regression. This is a necessary condition for
identi￿cation of the structural parameters in the indirect inference procedure
that we follow later in this paper.
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mean st.dev min max
e iit 0.00 0.13 -0.58 0.63
g iit￿1 0.00 0.13 -0.53 0.63
f ait 0.00 0.14 -0.70 0.63
(f ait)2 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.48
g ait￿1 0.00 0.15 -0.57 0.78
^ Bit=Kit 0.00 0.20 -1.24 0.87
(f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.19
Table 5. Correlation Matrix of the Regression Variables
e iit g iit￿1 f ait (f ait)2 g ait￿1 ^ Bit=Kit (f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2
e iit 1
g iit￿1 0.01 1
f ait 0.48 -0.14 1
(f ait)2 -0.04 0.06 -0.20 1
g ait￿1 0.22 0.52 0.48 0.04 1
^ Bit=Kit -0.27 0.16 -0.36 0.02 -0.16 1
(f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2 -0.04 -0.01 0.10 0.50 0.08 -0.15 1
Table 4 gives the summary statistics of the regression variables. Table
5 gives the correlation matrix. The investment rate is positively correlated
with the contemporaneous pro￿t shock (correlation is 0.48) as one should
expect and is negatively correlated with beginning of period leverage ratio
(correlation is -0.27). Also the shocks are positively autocorrelated (correla-
tion of the shock with its lag is 0.48). The pro￿t shocks are also negatively
correlated with the leverage ratio indicating that higher leveraged ￿rms are
more likely to face negative pro￿t shocks. The lagged pro￿t shock however
is practically uncorrelated with the leverage ratio.
Table 6 gives the regression results. These show that there is an economi-
cally important relationship between the pro￿t shocks the leverage ratio and
investment. A 1 standard deviation positive pro￿t shock (which implies an
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year by 6.7 percentage points. The relationship is somewhat nonlinear: 6.1
percentage points is coming from the shock and 0.6 percentage points from
the shock squared (The calculation is 0.11*0.557+0.11*0.11*0.531). The re-
action of investment to this shock the following year is almost nil (-0.005
= 0.067*0.197+0.11*-0.163). The negative coe¢ cient on the lagged pro￿t
shock o⁄sets the positive one on the lagged investment rate.
The negative coe¢ cient on the product between the pro￿t shock and the
leverage implies that the e⁄ect of a positive pro￿t shock on investment is
dampened when a ￿rm has high leverage. For instance, when ￿rm leverage
is 1 standard deviation (i.e 0.20) above its mean, the dampening e⁄ect is
0.1 percentage points (i.e. ((0.11*0.20)^2)*2.85). Also, independently of
the pro￿t shocks, when ￿rms have higher than average leverage, they invest
less. A 1 standard deviation higher leverage (i.e 0.20) is associated with an
investment rate that is lower than average by 0.02.
Table 6: Auxilliary Regression
Coe¢ cient
g iit￿1 0.197* (0.044)
f ait 0.557* (0.053)
(f ait)2 0.531* (0.155)
g ait￿1 -0.163*(0.052)
^ Bit=Kit -0.099* (0.029)
(f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2 -2.85* (0.701)
Note: The independent variable is the investment rate.
Robust standard errors (adj Rsq=0.22). * signi￿cant at the 1% level.
3.5 The Transition Matrix of Pro￿t Shocks
For the simulations of the theoretical investment model we represent the
aggregate and idiosyncratic components of the pro￿t shocks by ￿rst-order
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method due to Tauchen (1986): Since the standard deviation of the aggregate
part is very small (0.026) compared with the standard deviation of the time-
varying idiosyncratic part (0.12), we let the aggregate part take on only two
values: -0.026 and +0.026 . The probability that the aggregate shock changes
state is estimated at 0.26. The transition matrix is given below.




For the time-varying idiosyncratic part, ait; we discretize nonparamet-
rically the empirical distribution into 11 bins (9 bins each containing 10
percent of the observations and two outlier bins each containing 5 percent of
the observations). The transition matrix is calculated nonparametrically.
3.6 Structural Estimation
We proceed by ￿xing a priori some of the structural parameters of the model.
In particular, we set r = 0:0413; ￿ = 1=(1+d); d = 0:0549; ￿ = 0:085; p = 1;
and ￿ = 0:89: The interest rate r has two functions in our model. First, it is
the renumeration interest rate for the ￿rm if it has negative debt , i.e. if it
accumulates funds. Second, it is the lowest marginal interest rate at which
the ￿rm can borrow if it has zero debt. It is set at 4.13 percent which is the
average real yield on industry bonds in Germany over the period 1966-2002.





The discount rate is set at 5.49 percent. It is the average real yield on
German stocks (measured by the DAX index) over the period 1966-2002.
Setting the discount rate d higher than r ensures that a ￿rm has an incentive
to make dividend payments and not accumulate an in￿nite amount of assets.
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funds for investment. If r > d; the ￿rm simply accumulates funds and never
pays them out. Note that if such a ￿rm would never face negative shocks, it
would have an in￿nite value since the rate at which assets would accumulate,
r, would be larger than the discount rate. Since we impose d > r, the ￿rm has
an incentive to take positive debt to ￿nance itself. Only by taking positive
debt can the ￿rm equate the discount rate with the marginal cost of debt
￿nance.
The depreciation rate is based on our estimates with data from German
manufacturing industry and is described in the Appendix. The pro￿tability
curvature parameter, ￿; was estimated from our data as explained in Section
3.2. The vector of remaining structural parameters to be estimated is called
￿ ￿ (￿;￿;F). We will estimate them using the indirect inference method.20
This approach involves several well-de￿ned steps.
First, we solve the ￿rm￿ s dynamic programming problem for arbitrary val-
ues of the structural parameters, ￿; and generate the corresponding optimal
policy functions.21 Second, we use these policy functions and arbitrary initial
conditions to generate simulated data. In particular, we generate 14 arti￿cial
panels each containing data for 170 ￿rms for 7 years.22 Third, this simulated
20This approach was introduced by Gourieroux, and Monfort (1996), Gourieroux, Mon-
fort and Renault (1993), and Smith (1993). The following are some examples of empirical
papers using this approach. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003) estimate an investment model
with both convex and non-convex adjustment costs. Adda and Cooper (2000) study the
impact of scrapping subsidies on new car purchases. The distribution of price adjustment
costs are estimated by Willis (1999). Cooper and Ejarque (2003a and 2003b) investigate
the role of market power in the Q theory.
21The problem is solved using the value function iteration method. Rust (1987a and
1987b) applied this method in his studies. Christiano (1990a and 1990b) showed that
it performs better than linear-quadratic approximation in the context of the stochastic
growth model.
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coe¢ cients and moments we obtained using actual data.23 We have chosen
to match the coe¢ cients,  1 through  6, of the auxilliary regression (16) to-
gether with two moments: the standard deviation,  7 , and autocorrelation,
 8; of (demeaned) investment rates.
Fourth, we check whether the distance between ￿d; the vector of coe¢ -
cients from the actual data, and ￿s(￿); the vector of coe¢ cients from data
simulated given ￿; is arbitrarily close. If they are not, ￿ is updated in a
manner that is likely to make this distance smaller and go back to the ￿rst
step.










where W is a weighting matrix.24 In practice, we use the method of
simulated annealing in order to minimize J(￿):25
3.7 Results
The point estimates of the structural parameters are given in Table 7. The
parameter ￿ determines the external ￿nance premium. An increase of the
23It is important that the moments and the coe¢ cients used be responsive to changes
in the underlying structural parameters of the model. When that is the case, as speci￿ed
by Gourieroux and Monfort (1996), minimizing the distance between the simulated data
moments and the actual data moments will generate consistent estimates of the structural
parameters since the simulated moments depend on the structural parameters.
24We use the identity matrix, which provides consistent estimates.
25There are a couple of advantages of this method compared to the conventional al-
gorithms. First, this method explores the function￿ s entire surface. Thus it is almost
independent of starting values. The other advantage of this method is that it can escape
from local optima. Further, the assumptions regarding functional forms are not strict.
Go⁄e, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) provide evidence that this algorithm is quite good in
￿nding the global optimum for di¢ cult functions.
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the external ￿nance premium by 0.25 percentage points (i.e. 25 basis points).
Recalling that the baseline lending rate is 413 basis points, we have a 6
percent increase in the interest rate. Thus, the estimated impact of ￿nancial
frictions on investment is relatively modest.
Table 7. Estimates of the Structural Parameters




The parameters ￿ and F a⁄ect the cost of investing. The total cost of


















, is 0.009, the ￿xed cost, F; is 0.031. In other words, when
the investment rate is 0.19, total convex adjustment costs are 4.7 percent (or
0.009/0.19) of the purchase cost, and total ￿xed adjustment costs are 16.3
percent of the purchase cost of investing (0.031/0.19). Thus, it seems that
￿xed costs of adjustment are quantitatively more important than convex
ones. The fraction of total investment cost that is due to real frictions in
adjusting capital is 17.4 percent ((4.7+16.3)/(1+(4.7+16.3)). This is sub-
stantial though not excessive. It is of interest to compare our estimates of ￿
and F to those of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003): ￿ = 0:049 and F = 0:039.
The latter estimates a lower relative importance of convex adjustment costs.
It is likely that this arises from the level of aggregation of the data used:
plant level in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2003) versus ￿rm level in our paper.
Alternatively, it may result from di⁄erences in speci￿cation.
Table 8 shows the coe¢ cients of the auxilliary regression and the two
moments using the actual data and the simulated data (where the simulated
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the match is quite good with the exception of the serial correlation in invest-
ment (re￿ ected also in the coe¢ cient of lagged investment in the auxilliary
regression).
Table 8. Auxilliary Regression Coe¢ cients and Moments:
Actual versus Simulated Data
Coe¢ cient Data Std. error Model Std.error Di⁄erence
g iit￿1 0.197 (0.044) 0.036 (0.008) 0.161
f ait 0.557 (0.053) 0.369 (0.007) 0.188
(f ait)2 0.531 (0.155) 0.470 (0.025) 0.061
g ait￿1 -0.162 (0.051) -0.212 (0.007) 0.050
^ Bit=Kit -0.099 (0.029) -0.183 (0.006) 0.084
(f ait ^ Bit=Kit)2 -2.847 (0.701) -2.817 (0.314) -0.030
Moments Data Model
corr(e iit; g iit￿1) 0.008 -0.095 0.103
std(e iit) 0.139 0.145 -0.006
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) suggest a global speci￿cation
test for indirect estimation models based on the optimal value of the objective
function, which corresponds to Equation (17) in this paper. The statistics












where H is the number of arti￿cial panels, T is the number of years. It is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with q ￿p degrees of freedom,
where q is the dimension of moments and p is the dimension of structural
parameters. In our case, H = 14, T = 7, q = 8, and p = 3. The structural
parameters given in Table 7 produce min
￿
(￿d ￿ ￿s(￿))0W(￿d ￿ ￿s(￿)) =
0.086. Thus, the test statistics is equal to 0.562, which indicates that over-
identifying restrictions are not rejected.
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it performs in moments that were not attempted to be matched in estimation.
Table 9 shows some alternative moments for the actual and simulated data.
The model captures well the contemporaneous correlation of the pro￿t shock
with the investment rate. The simulated data display a substantial fraction
of investment spikes though a bit lower than in the data. The correlation
between investment and debt leverage as well as the serial correlation in lever-
age are matched quite well.26 However, the model has problems reproducing
the negative contemporaneous correlation between the pro￿t shock and the
leverage ratio.
Table 9. Comparing Moments
Data Model
corr(f ait; e iit) 0.48 0.30
Iit=Kit￿1 > 0:20 0.38 0.27
corr(f ait; ^ Bit=Kit ) -0.36 0.05
corr(e iit; ^ Bit=Kit ) -0.27 -0.24
corr( ^ Bit=Kit, ^ Bit￿1=Kit￿1) 0.42 0.71
4 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the interaction between ￿nance and investment
at the ￿rm level. Our key contribution is to move beyond simply testing
and rejecting a neoclassical model with convex adjustment costs. Instead,
we propose and estimate a speci￿c model of investment with costly external
￿nance and both convex and non-convex adjustment costs.
26Note that when setting the ￿nancing premium equal to zero (i.e. alpha=0) in the
model, the correlation between investment and debt leverage reduces to -0.20. A negative
correlation between debt leverage and investment is therefore not a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of external ￿nance premia.
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important in determining ￿rm investment dynamics. However, at least for our
sample of large German manufacturing ￿rms, the impact of external ￿nance
constraints on investment is relatively modest. Regarding real frictions, the
major component of adjustment costs seems to be ￿xed.
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A.1 Sample Selection
The major data source is the AMADEUS database from Bureau Van Dijk
(releases CD-rom June 2001 and September 1997). This is a database in-
cluding ￿rm balance sheet, and pro￿t and loss information for more than 30
European countries. We only use the information on German ￿rms. Our
analysis is concentrated on the largest German manufacturing ￿rms over the
period 1992-1999.27
The elimination of the ￿rms is conducted in a number of steps.
1. We use only consolidated accounts. This means that data are all on
the group level (capital stock, assets, turnover, etc.) There are 1334 ￿rms
(manufacturing and non-manufacturing) which have at least 1 year of con-
solidated accounts. The reason why we concentrate on consolidated accounts
are threefold. First, unconsolidated accounts can give a very misleading pic-
ture of the true nature of the ￿rm. It is customary that the output of a
large ￿rm is usually produced over multiple plants, each (or a few taken
together) with own legal identity and own unconsolidated account. For in-
stance, BASF AG has a consolidated turnover of around 30 billion euro,
while its unconsolidated turnover is around 11 billion euro. Second, the true
￿nancial boundaries of the ￿rms are the group, not the individual plants. For
instance for investment purposes, cash ￿ ow generated by one plant can easily
be transferred to other plants. Third, limiting ourselves to consolidated data
makes our study more comparable with US studies based on COMPUSTAT,
27Most German ￿rms have only minor legal obligations to provide accounting informa-
tion. Thus we excluded the ￿rms which did not report their capital stock information. For
instance, the June 2001 CD-rom contains accounting information on 39,965 ￿rms (both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing ￿rms), however 32,832 have only limited account-
ing information. In general these ￿rms are relatively small or subsidiaries of larger ￿rms.
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which contains consolidated data.2. We only keep manufacturing ￿rms which have at least 7 years of
consecutive information on the book value of capital stock and depreciation.
This leads to 200 ￿rms.
3. We only keep ￿rms if they have information on pro￿ts and cash ￿ ow.
This leads to 170 ￿rms.
4. We do not use all observations. We checked on the websites of many
companies and found that if the investment rate was higher than 0.9 (90%)
this practically always was measuring a merger or acquisition. So we deleted
all observations for which the investment rate was over 90% . We also deleted
either the years before or after these investment rates of 90% (depending on
what rendered the most data left over), to account for the fact that the ￿rm
could change substantially as a result of any merger or acquisition activities.
This leads to our ￿nal dataset of 170 ￿rms on 1163 observations. The dataset
is unbalanced. However, each ￿rm has at least 3 observations. On average, a
￿rm has 6.8 observations. The maximum number of observations for a ￿rm
is 8.
These 170 ￿rms are truly the largest ones. The total replacement value of
their capital stock was 101 billion euro in 1995, while the total manufacturing
industry in Germany had the capital stock of 483 billion euro.
A.2 Description of the Variables
A.2.1 Raw Variables from the CD-rom
FIAS: Fixed assets; represent the book value of all ￿xed assets of the ￿rm,
including building and structures, machinery and equipment, intangible ￿xed
assets, and ￿nancial ￿xed assets (share ownership in other companies)
OFAS: other ￿xed assets, mainly ￿nancial ￿xed assets
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DEPR: depreciation
PL: pro￿t or loss of the year; operating pro￿ts after exceptional items, tax-
ation and interest payments
STAF: wage bill of the ￿rm
A.2.2 Constructed Variables
Book value capital stock, Kb
t : constructed by the calculation FIAS-OFAS.
Investment price de￿ator, P I
t : constructed by dividing aggregate industry
investment data in current by prices of 1995.
Investment at current prices, I c
t : The AMADEUS database does not give
gross investment ￿gures directly. They have to be calculated using depre-






Real investment, I t : constructed as investment at current prices de￿ ated by
the investment price de￿ ator Ic
t=P I
t .
Real capital stock, Kt: constructed using the perpetual inventory method.
The book value of the ￿rst year was multiplied by a factor 1.26/P I
t to convert
the book value into the replacement value at 1995 prices. The factor 1.26
was derived from aggregate German data by dividing the net capital stock
in manufacturing at replacement prices by the net capital stock at historical
acquisition prices. The depreciation rates were constructed using aggregate
industry level data. The depreciation rates are between 6 and 13 percent.
34
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 566
December 2005The average depreciation rate is 8.5 percent. The perpetual inventory formula
is Kt = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt￿1 + It
Investment rate, It
Kt￿1: constructed by dividing I t by Kt￿1:
Real pro￿ts, ￿t: constructed as operating pro￿ts plus depreciation (OPPL+DEPR)
de￿ ated by the German GDP de￿ ator.
Real cash ￿ow, CFit: constructed as pro￿ts or loss plus depreciation (PL+DEPR)
de￿ ated by the German GDP de￿ ator.
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